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ABSTRACT
In deregulated transport markets, a firm’s ownership status and management system represent
an important issue. Economic theory suggests that productivity and performance are higher in
the private than in the public sector. In Switzerland, providers of bus transportation are
traditionally corporations, though a large part of their equity shares are still held by the public
sector (federal government, cantons, municipalities). In this paper we examine the potential
impact of ownership on the cost of bus service provision for a sample of private, public and
mixed bus companies in Switzerland. We have considered the estimation of a translog cost
model for 34 bus transit companies observed over 5 years (1991-1995). The results only
partially confirm that if the private sector holds shares in the company’s capital, efficiency is
enhanced. In addition, measures of economies of scale and density are derived and discussed
within the actual public transport policy.
1. Introduction
In recent decades the public transport policy of most industrialized countries has
been characterized by deregulation and/or privatization policies1.
Following the changes in the transport policy of the EC and the increasing subsidies
for operations and infrastructures, the Swiss public transport policy has experienced several
                                                                
1 See Berechman (1993) for an exhaustive overview on the deregulation policies pursued in different
industrialized countries.
3unavoidable regulatory reforms. These reforms were also induced by the findings of studies
by Filippini et al. (1992) and Filippini, Prioni (1994), which empirically demonstrated the
relation between the poor performance of Swiss bus operators in the pre-reform years to the
subsidies, public obligations and the compensatory payments for the approximated tariff2.
Since 1996 the Swiss3 government has been introducing important reforms in the
regulation of the regional public transport system in order to encourage competition for the
market4. The new regional transport policy recognizes the earlier regulatory failures. With the
implementation of a bidding system for regional transport services and the removal of the
compensations for revenue reductions and approximated tariffs, the new act introduced
greater market incentives for competitive behavior and efficient production.
Although the studies by Filippini et al. (1992) and Filippini, Prioni (1994) provided
evidence on the economic consequences of regulation, due to lack of information no attention
was given to the effect of ownership type on performance. In Switzerland, private, public and
mixed firms characterize the regional public transit industry. 5 The main function of these
companies is to link mainly rural areas to an urban transport network or to the intercity
railway line. The majority of these companies are stock companies created by private
investors or by municipalities.
This mixed economy within the regional public transport market raises the
interesting issue of the effects on costs of the different ownership structures and institutional
organization form. Hence, the following question becomes central for policy makers: are
private bus companies more efficient than public bus companies?
In a changing competitive environment such questions become increasingly relevant,
first, for transport operators in terms of an improved knowledge about efficient organizational
forms, and second, for transport regulators as input into establishing new competitive rules.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical background on
the effects of ownership on efficiency. Section 3 discusses the cost model; section 4 presents
the data, while section 5 illustrates the empirical results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
                                                                
2 See Filippini et al (1992) for a comprehensive description of the regulatory setting and subsidization system in
the regional public transport system in Switzerland.
3  Switzerland is a confederation composed of 26 cantons and approximately 3000 municipalities. This federal
state is characterized by a high degree of decentralization in the provision of public services. For instance, each
canton in cooperation with the municipalities has a high degree of autonomy in the organization, planning and
regulation of the local public transport.
4 See “revised Railway Act (revidierte Eisenbahngesetz), 1996.
42. The influence of ownership on the cost of bus service provision
In comparing the relative efficiency between public ownership and private
ownership, property rights theory has been often employed. Following Alchian (1965) and
Demsetz (1967), property rights theory analyses how the different incentives created by the
system of property rights affect organizational behavior and company performance. A right of
ownership comprises several rights: the rights to define the goals of a firm, to appoint the
managers, to influence the conduct of a firm, to keep the extra profits and to sell the property
rights. In a private firm, managers will make the day-to-day decisions for the owners. In
reality, these agents probably acquire some independence and have the opportunity to act as
imperfect agents. In this case we have a typical agency problem, where the principal cannot
perfectly monitor the actions of the agent. Thus, the agent could have incentives to deviate
from the pure profit-maximizing goal and try to attain some non-pecuniary benefits such as
pleasant office space and extra staff.
In the case of a public firm, the taxpayers are the owners of the firm and control the
way the firm conducts its activities through their representatives in the parliament and in the
government. These representatives are charged with managing the company in such a way as
to maximize social welfare. Public representatives in turn delegate control to a commission,
which oversees the management of the company. In comparison to private firms, public firms
experience a radical attenuation of property rights resulting in a more significant reduction of
incentives for the management to minimize costs and to follow the owner’s interests.
Moreover, the principal-agent problems within state-owned companies are more complex than
those in the private sector. In the case of a private-sector company, the management itself
answers only to the shareholders, and the employment relationship involves the management
and the employees. Within the public sector, the chain of command from the electorate to the
management go through the parliament, the government and the commission. For instance,
Niskanen’s model of bureaucrats’ behavior assumes that bureaucrats attempt to maximize
their own utility rather than that of the electorate they serve.6
In a natural monopoly, however, the regulation of a private-sector firm can be more
difficult than that of a public-sector firm, because of more asymmetric information between
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
5 “Private firms” refers to those firms whose shares are held by the private sector; “public firms” refers to those
firms whose shares are held by public bodies or governments, for example municipalities; and “mixed firms”
refers to those firms whose shares are held by both sectors.)
6 See Niskanen (1975).
5the private firm and the regulator than between the public firm and the regulator. Therefore, in
a situation of natural monopoly we can identify a trade-off between two sources of
inefficiency in private and public companies: inefficiency from regulation of private firms and
inefficiency from the attenuation of property rights in public firms.
A number of recent studies have compared the cost efficiency of public and private
bus transit companies. The empirical results do not provide conclusive evidence regarding the
efficient form of ownership.7
In this paper we test the effect of ownership on the production cost using a sample of
Swiss bus companies. The test is performed by introducing in a cost model specification a
dummy variable to differentiate the two forms of ownership: private and public.8
3. Specification of the Total Cost Function
 
 Cost functions in the bus industry are well documented in empirical research (see
Berechman, 1993 for a good overview). Cost specifications traditionally assume operating
cost as a function of output and input prices (capital, labor and energy price). However,
several authors go beyond this specification and identify other exogenous variables, which
can further explain cost differences among the observations. For example, several studies
recognize output heterogeneity by adding to the cost function specification a series of output
and/or network characteristics such as the length of the network, the number of stops and the
frequency9. Another group of factors likely to influence operating cost includes regulatory
features, ownership form and environmental characteristics. Obviously such variables will be
considered in the cost function specification provided that they respond to the research
interest, that they are measurable and finally that a certain variability among the observations
exists.
 It is worth noting that, although such variables are theoretically justified, their
inclusion in the cost function specification notably increases the number of explanatory
variables, which in turn reduces the degrees of freedom, which requires more data for the
econometric estimation.
                                                                
7  See for an overview of 13 early studies Perry et al. (1986) and Bhattacharyya et al. (1995) and Cowie, J.,
Asenova, D. (1999) for more recently published work.
8  The sample of companies used in this study covers the period 1991-1995. In this period the bus companies
operated as franchised local monopolies, assigned without a competitive tendering process.
9 See for instance Spady and Friedlaender (1978) and De Borger (1991).
6 Given the above evidence and our focus on the ownership structure of bus operators,
we specify the following cost function:
 ( )TPpppnycC ECL ,,,,,,= (1)
 We assume the total cost of a bus transit company C to be a function of the output y,
the network characteristic n, the factor prices p (labor L, capital C and energy E) and the
variable P representing the ownership variable. Finally, the variable T captures the effect of
technical change occurring over the years.
Using a translog function, the expression in (1) can be approximated by the
following total cost function:10
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Note that by normalizing total cost and input prices by one of the input prices (here
the price of capital), we impose the theoretical condition that the cost function is linearly
homogeneous in input prices.
To improve the efficiency of the estimation, we will append the factor share
equations derived by applying Shepard’s Lemma to (2).
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The empirical study is therefore focused on a cost model with estimation of the cost
function and two factor share equations (the share equation of capital was dropped from the
estimating system).
The estimation of a cost function enables us to derive some important characteristics
of bus supply technology such as economies of density, economies of scale and elasticities of
                                                                
10 A translog function requires the approximation of the underlying cost function to be made at a local point,
which in our case is taken at the median point of all variables. Thus, all independent variables are normalized
at their median points.
7substitutions. These technology characteristics are particularly interesting in a translog
framework, as this functional form does not require restrictive a priori assumptions, allowing
these measures to vary with the firm’s size.
The distinction between economies of density and economies of scale is very
important in industries that provide their services over a network (for example transport
industries or energy distribution utilities). In such cases firm size is more closely tied to the
size of the network than to the output provided over that network. For this reason it is
important to distinguish cost changes that occur because of output changes only and cost
changes that occur because of a proportional network and output change.
Economies of density are defined as the increase in total cost resulting from an
increase in output, holding all input prices and the network size fixed (Caves, Christensen and
Tretheway, 1984).
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Economies of density exist if ED is greater than 1. For values of ED below 1, we
identify diseconomies of density. The existence of economies of density implies that the
average costs of a bus operator decrease as physical output increases.  In the case of ED = 1,
no economies or diseconomies of density exist.
Slightly different is the definition of economies of scale. Here, the increase in the
total cost is brought about by a proportional increase in output and in the network size,
holding the factor prices constant. According to this definition, ES can be written as:
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Applied to the translog specification in (2),
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Similarly, economies of scale exist if ES 1 is greater than 1. A value of ES below 1
indicates diseconomies of scale.
8Another important feature of bus supply technology consists of the estimation of
elasticities of substitution between two input factors to test whether complementary or
substitution relationships dominate. The general expression for Allen elasticity of substitution
between two inputs m and n (m¹n) (see for example Williams, Dalal, 1981) is given by:
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According to our translog model specification, the formula in (7) can be written as:
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where the ai are directly the parameters in the translog specification. Negative (positive)
values of qmn indicate complements (substitutes).
4. Data and variable specification
To estimate the cost model described in (2), financial and operating data from
sampled operators was required. The Swiss Federal Statistics Office collects financial and
operating data for all 178 regional bus transit companies in Switzerland. However, for some
of the bus transit companies only incomplete information is available. For this reason, in a
first trial we had to restrict our sample size to 90 operators, for which complete data was
available.
In order to test the ownership hypothesis we conducted a survey using a mail
questionnaire, where we asked the 90 pre-selected operators to report the institutional form of
business organization and the ownership structure of the company’s capital. We asked for the
shareholders’ composition because many bus companies, although corporations, are more
than 50% held by public bodies. Accordingly the share of the company’s capital held by the
private sector varies between 0 and 100%. Of the 90 survey forms sent out, we received 34
useful replies. The results showed that, of the 34 bus transit companies, 8 are private (i.e. the
private-sector share is equal to 100%), 4 are public (100% of the capital is in public hands)
and 22 are mixed enterprises. Moreover, although corporations dominate (29), other
institutional forms are represented in the sample (for example cooperatives).
9In order to increase the sample size, the 34 bus transit companies were observed over
5 years (1991-1995), which gave us a sample of 170 observations.
The variables for the cost function specification were calculated as follows. Total
cost C is calculated as the total expenditures of the bus companies per year. The output (y) is
measured in bus kilometers and seat kilometers alternatively. The choice of these two output
measures is twofold. First we recognize that output in cost function estimations is better
represented by pure supply output measures. Alternatively some authors use passenger
revenue (as in Button, 1985) or passenger trips (Berechman, 1987). We believe that such
demand-related output measures are inadequate in cost function estimations as they mainly
reflect consumed and not produced output. Second, bus-kilometers and seat-kilometers are the
most commonly used supply-related output measures in the empirical literature11. Bus-
kilometers assume vehicles as the relevant output unity, whereas the seat-kilometers allow for
differences in the fleet capacity. “Seats” refer to seated places and standing places.
The output characteristic variable (n) is described by the length of the network and
the number of stops alternatively. Other output characteristic variables such as a load factor or
the number of stops per meter of network were initially considered; however, we dropped
them from the model because of multicollinearity problems.
Input prices are defined as factor expenditures per factor unit.  Labor price (pL) is
defined as the ratio of annual labor costs to total number of employees. Energy costs divided
by the total annual fuel consumption approximates the unit cost of energy (pE). Following
Friedlaender et al (1983), the capital price (pC) is calculated as residual cost (where residual
cost is total cost minus labor and energy cost) divided by the number of vehicles in the
operator’s fleet. Unfortunately no data were available which would allow us to calculate the
capital stock using the capital inventory method. The use of a simple indicator is justified by
the fact that the bus companies do not possess a significant stock of capital apart from the
rolling stock.
 All input prices, total cost and variable cost are corrected for price changes over the
years to 1993 constant Swiss franc Consumer Price Index. The variable T is a time variable,
which captures the shift in technology.
As a final step, the dummy variable P is introduced to investigate the potential
impact of ownership on the cost of bus service provision. P takes the value of 1 if the share of
the company’s capital held by the private sector exceeds 50%, otherwise it takes 0 as a
                                                                
11 See for example Berechman (1987), Viton (1986) and Filippini et al. (1994).
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value12. The choice of this particular specification for P was mainly due to the fact that the
majority of the firms are corporations in which the public sector (state, cantons,
municipalities) holds a share. Therefore, we assume that companies in which the share held
by the private sector exceeds 50% are controlled and managed following the strategy and
goals of the private shareholders.
A description of some variables used in this analysis is included in Table 2.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variables Unit of measurement 1. Quartile Median 3. Quartile
Total cost SwF. 780500 1895000 3527500
Bus Kilometers 176’000 421’000 617’000
Seat Kilometers 11188000 29659000 65695000
No. of buses 5 9 20
No. of employees (external
excl.)
5 13 28
Length of the network Meters 20.8 40.1 62.6
Number of stops 25 44 82
Labor price SwF. per worker 87676 104400 119770
Capital price SwF. per seat
kilometer
21367 32917 49610
Energy price SwF. per liter 0.474 0.529 0.595
No of 0 No of 1
P: Dummy for private Takes the value 0 or 1 21 13
5. Estimation Results
The system of equations consisting of the cost function in (2) and the 2 factor share
equations (3a+3b) was estimated using maximum-likelihood. Table 3 presents the parameter
estimates and standard errors of the translog cost function. In Model 1, the output variable is
measured by the total bus kilometres provided by each operator, and the network is
represented by its length. In Model 2, output is represented by the total amount of seat
kilometres and the network characteristics by the number of stops.
                                                                
12 Since data on P were collected during 1997-1998, we assumed that during 1991-1995 no significant changes
occurred in the shares held by the private sector. This assumption was confirmed by interviews with several
bus transit industry specialists and by the Federal Department of Transport.
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Table 3: Total-cost parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses)
Coefficient  Model 1
(Bus-kilometers/
network length)
Model 2
(Seat-Kilometers/
Number of stops)
Constant 14.712***
(0.085)
14.584***
(0.099)
a Y 0.729***
(0.047)
0.506***
(0.051)
a N 0.224***
(0.062)
0.348***
(0.075)
a PL 0. 563***
(0.007)
0. 561***
(0.007)
a PE 0.047***
(0.003)
0.045***
(0.003)
a YY 0.253***
(0.082)
0.191***
(0.071)
a NN 0.112
(0.133)
-0.013
(0.165)
a PLPL -0.017
(0.012)
-0.015
(0.013)
a PEPE -0.045***
(0.006)
-0.048***
(0.006)
a YN -0.118
(0.091)
-0.058
(0.097)
a YPL 0.028***
(0.009)
0.026***
(0.009)
a YPE 0.014***
(0.004)
0.014***
(0.004)
a NPL -0.029**
(0.012)
-0.028**
(0.013)
a NPE -0.010*
(0.005)
-0.005
(0.005)
a PLPE 0.061***
(0.004)
0.069***
(0.004)
a PRIV -0.243***
(0.068)
-0.108
(0.082)
a T -0.038*
(0.021)
-0.043*
(0.025)
Likelihood -12.97 -12.60
*, **, ***: significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95%, 99% confidence level.
Both estimated functions are well-behaved. Most of the parameter estimates are
statistically significant and carry the expected sign.
Since total cost as well as the output variables are in natural logarithms and have
been normalized, the first order coefficients can be interpreted as cost elasticities evaluated at
the sample median. Output elasticity in the first model, where we used bus kilometres as
output variable, is 0.729, whereas it is 0.506 in the second model, where we used seat
12
kilometres13. This implies that a 1% increase in output will increase total cost by 0.729% and
0.506% respectively. It is not surprising that bus kilometres are more cost elastic than seat
kilometres. If we assume the same percentage increase in output in terms of bus kilometres or
seat kilometres, it follows that running an extra bus costs more than adding an extra seat to an
existing bus. One reason for this may be the fact that the increase in output measured in bus
kilometres implies higher costs that an increase in the seat capacity of the bus.
The cost elasticity of the network length (model 1) is as expected positive (0.141)
and significant. In the second model the parameter estimate is 0.348, suggesting that a 1%
increase in the number of stops affect operating cost more considerably than a 1% increase in
the network length. Similar results were obtained by Filippini et al. (1992) and Filippini,
Prioni (1994) for a sample of bus companies in Switzerland, and Windle (1988) for the U.S.
bus industry.
The median cost elasticities with respect to factor prices are positive and of similar
magnitude in both versions of the cost model. The estimated coefficients for price of labor
(0.563/0.561) and price of energy (0.047/0.045) estimate the share of costs attributed to labor
and energy at the median production. Although the share equation for capital was dropped,
the linear homogeneity conditions imply that the coefficient for capital is (0.390/0.394).
Summarizing, labor cost accounts for 56%, energy cost for 4.6% and capital cost for 40% at
the median observation. These results are in the range of the previous findings.14
The trend variable is negative and significant at the 90% confidence level in both
model specifications. This implies that the Swiss bus companies experienced neutral
technological progress over these years (1991-1995).
The ownership hypothesis is accepted at the 95% confidence level in Model 1,
whereas Model 2 does not seem to support our expectations. The negative coefficient for
aPRIV in Model 1 suggests that bus companies that are more than 50% held by the private
sector operate at lower cost than bus companies less than 50% held by the private sector, or
public companies. These results suggest that first, empirical findings are highly sensitive to
the variable specification and second, that ownership can be of limited relevance in highly
regulated markets. A study by Fazioli et al. (1993) came up with similar conclusions for a
sample of bus operators in northern Italy. More recent studies (see Cowie, Asenova, 1999)
                                                                
13  In a previous study, Filippini, Prioni (1993) found a higher cost elasticity with respect to output (measured in
seat-kilometers). However, this might be due to the different sample size, data type (cross section) and
methodology.
13
identify British privately-held companies more technically efficient. However, the authors
relate the poor performances of public companies to some industry characteristics rather than
to the ownership structure. Finally, a study by Jorgenson et al. (1995) found no differences in
the performance of private and public bus operators in Norway.
Apparently there is no strong empirical evidence supporting the ownership
hypothesis in the bus industry, suggesting two main conclusions. First, differences may be
conducted to different model specifications and estimation procedures and second, market
structure could be a more important factor in explaining differences in efficiency.
Economies of Scale and Density
The following table presents the estimated economies of scale and economies of
density for the median bus operator calculated according to the formula specified in (4) and
(6). Note that factor prices are held constant equal to the median values. Table 3 presents the
estimates obtained from both models.
Table 3 - Economies of scale and density (Standard errors in parenthesis)
Economies of
Density
Economies of Scale
Model1 :  421,000 Bus-Km,
40.1       Km
1.37 ( 0.08) 1.04 (0.10)
Model2 :  29,659,000 Seat-Km,
44          Stops
1.97 (0.17) 1.17 (0.15)
We note that the indicators for economies of density in both model specifications are
greater than 1. This suggests that medium-sized operators fail in operating to an optimal
density scale.  More intensive use of a given network would decline cost per bus kilometer
and seat kilometer respectively. However, such a strategy implies the existence of a market
for bus services, which under the actual conditions and the constantly decreasing patronage
levels cannot be assumed. Regarding the scale economies, medium-sized operators are better
off (1.04 vs. 1.17). According to Model 1, bus companies manage to operate at an optimal
scale level, suggesting an efficient network length and level of physical output, which should
ensure all the rest remaining constant a continued existence. Slightly higher is the estimated
value for the economies of scale in model 2 (1.17), indicating that the model specification
influences results and policy implications. However, the difference in the result is relatively
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
14  See Filippini et al. and Filippini, Prioni (1994) for previous results. Similar results for the bus industry in
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small, suggesting that with high probability operators manage to operate at an optimal scale
level. Similar results were obtained by the study undertaken by Berechman and Giulliano
(1985). They found that empirical findings on scale and density economies are highly
influenced by the choice of the output measure and the functional form adopted.
Elasticities
In this section we apply the expression derived in (7) to calculate the elasticity of
substitution between energy and capital, energy and labor, and capital and labor. Our
expectation is that technically superior buses (in some measure induced by capital subsidies)
should improve fuel efficiency and enhance the substitution possibilities between energy and
capital. The increasing commercialization of new vehicle and fuel options, due to a shift in
priorities towards a sustainable public transport system, aim to reduce pollution and minimize
petroleum fuel use in the bus transit industry. The incremental costs associated with operating
alternative fuel buses are mainly increased capital outlays. Increased capital outlays are
attributable to the additional costs (if any) of acquiring alternative fuel buses and modifying
facilities.
The estimated parameters for qEC are 0.0006 for Model 1 and 0.00007 for Model 2,
indicating no significant relationship between the two inputs. In other words an increase in
energy (fuel) price does not seem to affect capital demand. The reason could lie in the
relatively long average vehicle life, which ranges from 12 to 25 years depending on the
quality of maintenance and intensity of vehicle utilization (Williams, Dalal, 1981). Operators
do not have any incentives to accelerate the replacement of older (not fully amortized)
vehicles with new environmentally cleaner vehicles. Probably the introduction of ecological
taxes would speed up the replacement process and get a more significant substitution
relationship between capital and fuel.
The estimated elasticity between labor and energy is 0.007 in both model
specifications, suggesting very limited substitution possibilities. This is not surprising as these
two factors enter the production process in fixed proportions.
Considerably higher is the estimated partial elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor (0.265 and 0.252 respectively). Although some literature recognizes only partial
substitution capabilities between these two factors, this result indicates that substitution
possibilities exist. For example the introduction of modern customer information systems and
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Britain were found by Button O’Donnel (1985).
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the more frequent use of automatic ticketing systems could explain this high degree of
substitution between capital and labor.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we examine the potential impact of ownership on the cost of bus transit
service provision for a sample of private, public and mixed regional bus companies in
Switzerland. For this purpose we have considered the estimation of two translog cost models
for 34 bus operators observed over 5 years (1991-1995). In the first model output and network
characteristic are specified as bus kilometer and networks length, whereas in the second
model seat kilometers and number of stops are used. The ownership variable enters the
translog cost models as a dummy variable P. The dummy takes the value of 1 if the
company’s capital has a private equity share greater than 50%; otherwise it is zero. The
results only partially confirm the expectations that private firms should operate more
efficiently than public ones. The significance of the ownership’s parameter is slightly
dependent on the specification of the output and network variables. Similar ambiguous results
are common in the literature, suggesting that the ownership hypothesis needs to be tested and
discussed within the particular regulatory setting and the market structure.
The explanatory power of the model gives us an insight into the nature of the
production technology of the regional bus system in terms of economies of scale and density.
The results show that bus operators fail to operate at an efficient density. However, service
intensification seems an inadequate strategy under the actual demand conditions. Regarding
the economies of scale, the results indicate that medium-sized bus companies manage to
operate at constant returns to scale.
16
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